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Summary findings
In Namibia, the extended family is a big shock absorber:  Child allowances should relieve poverty, but the three
informal sharing arrangements between and within  main grants for needy children are heavily urban-biased
households are a unique source of strength.  and regionally asymmetric. The bias toward urban and
Grandparents contribute enormously to the continuation  middle-class children is greatest for in-kind (school
of this safety net by letting the entire family share their  feeding and shelter/housing) programs. A priority should
social pension in times of need and by looking after their  be placed on reallocating public resources to upgrade
grandchildren when parents are away or infected by  squatter settlements and single-room apartments.
AIDS.  Nongovernmental  organizations need to be encouraged
But these informal safety nets are not robust at times  to explore demand-driven approaches to promoting
of drought and are strained when unemployment, and  informal businesses in rural Namibia.
the burden of children of AIDS-infected parents, are  Programs to subsidize welfare homes and remit rent
high.  for apartments where rent is overdue should be
Among formal safety net programs, the social pension  eliminated to free up resources for social pensions and
and the disability grant touch the lives of the poor more  disability grants. It appears best to supplement cash
than other programs, but the administration of both  transfer programs by a better targeted shelter/housing
programs needs to improve.  program and an expanded labor-based works program
Namibia is one of the few African countries to  (implemented by private contractors).
administer a social pension for everyone 60 and over - The Northern  and Northeastern provinces are
a safety net that has potential to significantly reduce  underserved by all transfer programs; coverage in the
poverty. But the program suffers from undercoverage  North  must improve. Further  decentralization should
(exclusion errors) in the heavily populated and poorer  help rationalize the deployment of staff resources in
North.  social welfare.
With the disability pension, regional asymmetry is
pervasive and needs immediate correction.
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In Namibia,  the  extended  family is a  big  "shock  absorber":  informal sharing
arrangements between and within households are Namibia's  unique source  of strength.
Grandparents contribute enormously to  the continuation of this safety net by letting the
entire  family share  their  social  pension in  times  of  need,  and  by  looking  after  their
grandchildren while parents are away or are AIDS-infected.  Yet,  these informal safety
nets are not robust during periods of drought, and are strained in normal times due to the
high  levels  of  unemployment  and  the  growing  burden  of  children  of  AIDS-infected
parents.
Of all the formal safety net programs, the social pension program and the disability
grant touch the lives of the poor more than other programs.  Namibia is one of the few
countries in  Africa to  administer a  social pension program  for  every individual after
attaining the age of 60:  a  formal safety net with  significant poverty-reducing impacts.
However, the current operation of the program suffers from an under-coverage (exclusion
errors) in the heavily populated  and poorer North.  As for the disability pension, the
regional asymmetry is pervasive and needs immediate correction.  The beneficial impacts
on the poor can be significantly  enhanced by better administration of both programs.
Of the remaining cash transfer programs, child allowances are important from the
perspective of poverty relief.  However, the three main grants  for needy children also
suffer from regional asymmetry and are heavily urban-biased.  The pro-urban and -middleclass  bias  appear  highest  for  in-kind programs,  viz.,  school  feeding  programs  and
shelter/housing  programs.  Upgradation  of  squatter  settlements  and  single-room
apartments, and  provision water and sanitation facilities are a priority; public resources
need to be reallocated to these programs of direct relevance to the rural poor.
The country has many other transfer programs  including subsidization of welfare
homes and remission of rent for apartments with overdue  rents.  The impact of these
programs on poverty appears at best dubious.  Elimination of these programs will release
the  administrative resources  needed to  implement social  pensions and  disability grants
more effectively.  The resource savings may contribute to  overall fiscal sustainability of
programs.
The Northern  and North-eastern  provinces are  considerably underserved by  all
transfer programs.  At the same time, the administrative cost has sharply increased in the
recent period.  Some redeployment of staff may be necessary to implement the programs
effectively and also to save on administrative costs.  The ongoing decentralization efforts
should  provide  an  opportunity  to  bring  about  a  more  rational  deployment  of  staff
resources of the Directorate of Social Welfare than at present.
Of the programs with a work requirement, the labor-based works program is of
considerable importance for the country.  At present, only a meager amount of resources
is devoted to  this program.  In comparison with equipment-based programs for  similar
iiactivities, the  labor-based  program  appears  to  be  both  technically and  economically
feasible in Namibia.  On a priority basis, attention needs to  be devoted to enhancing the
capacity to implement and manage these programs.
The principal conclusion of this study is while the informal safety net is unable to
cope  with  the  increasing  demands,  the  formal  programs  are  too  many and  poorly
administered. The result:  pervasive regional asymmetry, exclusion errors and fraud.  To
enhance the potential for poverty reduction in a fiscally sustainable manner, the programs
need to be reduced to  four basic programs-a  social pension, a disability grant, a blind
person grant, and a child maintenance grant.  The programs'  coverage of the rural North
needs to be improved. The cash transfer programs need to be  supplemented by a better
targeted  shelter/housing  program,  and  an  expanded  labor-based  works  program
(implemented by private contractors).  To promote informal businesses in rural Namibia,
the potential for  demand-driven approaches needs to  be  explored  by encouraging the
ongoing efforts of non-governmental organizations.




1.  Namibia  has  inherited  a  strongly  dualistic  economy  and  society.  Extreme
inequality between ethnic (racial) groups and language groups is a unique characteristic of
Namibia.  Yet, poverty and vulnerability in Namibia is somewhat similar to  other African
countries:  a  high  incidence of  poverty  in  rural  areas  and,  sharp  rural-urban  income
differentials,  a high prevalence of female-headed households, high levels of unemployment
and  urban migration, and a  growing burden of children of AIDS-infected parents.  An
ungenerous agro-climatic environment (over 92 percent of the country is arid or desert)
contributes  to  inter-  and  intra-year  fluctuations in  income  (welfare)  and  renders  a
permanent escape from poverty difficult  for most households.
2.  To  alleviate poverty, the  Government  of Namibia  has  emphasized, inter alia,
income-support programs of various kinds including social pensions for the elderly and the
disabled, a variety of grants  for children, labor-based works  programs,  and  shelter and
housing programs.  Notwithstanding  the  range  of  programs  and  a  large  amount  of
resources  devoted  to  their  implementation, there  has  been no  empirical overview  of
programs and their poverty- and inequality-reducing impacts.  This paper fills this gap.
Scope and Limitations  of the study.
3.  While the paper covers all the major cash and in-kind programs and  programs
with  a  work  requirement, the  principal limitation of the  study  is that  it  is based  on
secondary sources of information.  The only primary source -- the Household Income andExpenditure  Survey  --  has  some  information  on  social  pensions.  However,  this
information is not reported in such a way as to facilitate an estimation of the severity of
poverty  with  and  without  the  transfer.  Most  administering  offices do  not  collect
information on beneficiary profiles so that it is difficult to assess the distributional impacts
of transfers.  Even at the aggregate level, while budgeted numbers are available, there is a
large time gap in the collection and reporting of data on actual numbers.  Despite these
difficulties and data gaps, an effort has been made to  use  all available information and
identify the main iissues.
4.  This paper is organized as follows.  Section (II) provides an overview of publicly-
funded programs and informal safety nets.  The cash transfer programs are reviewed in
section  III,  shelter  and  housing programs  in  section  IV,  social security  programs  in
Section V and programs with a work requirement in section VI.  The implications on the
proposed decentralization for program delivery are examined in section VII.  The main
recommendations are summarized in the last section.
II.  Namibia's  social safety net: An Overview
5.  Figure  I presents the prevailing formal and informal safety nets in Namibia.  A
variety of informall  sharing arrangements within and between households exist in Namibia.
Formal  safety nets  consists  of  four  categories:  cash  transfers  administered  by  the
Department of Social Welfare, a school feeding program administered by the Ministry of
Basic Education and Culture, a shelter/housing program administered by the Ministry of
Local Government and Housing, and a social security program for formal sector workers
administered by the newly created Social Security Commission. Transfers with  a work
2requirement comprise of food- or cash-for-works programs usually administered during a
drought  year,  labor-based  works  program  administered at  all times,  and  microcredit
programs.
A.  Informal  safety net.
6.  As with other countries of Africa, family and/or community-based informal sharing
arrangements constitute the most pervasive safety net in the country.  According to the
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1993-94), over 50 percent of households are
extended families;' and about 10 percent of households have non-relatives as household
members.
7.  An important function performed by extended families is taking care of children
usually by grand-parents  while parents are either away in urban areas in income-earning
activities, or are AIDS-affected.  Disabled children are especially looked after by grand-
parents.  While no monetary value can be placed on this function, it is worth stressing that
in its absence the overall poverty situation, especially of children,  would have been much
worse.
An "extended  family" is defined  as one  which includes  at least one of the following  categories:  own
children's spouse.  children's children,  parents  (including  spouse's parents) or other relatives.
3Figui-e 1.
NAMIBIA'S  SOCIAL  SAFETY NET
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48.  How  well do  the informal arrangements function during  a  crop  failure?  This
question is important because as already noted, over 90 percent of Namibia is arid/desert
or drought-prone.  An analysis of coping strategies in two drought-prone areas during the
1992 drought  suggests that the  informal support  systems are not  robust  or  resilient to
drought conditions (T. Naeraa et. al.,  1993).  This is not a surprising finding, since all
households  in a  given  region  face  declining incomes under  drought  conditions,  thus
restricting the scope for informal sharing (especially of  food).  In a drought situation, not
only do formal cash transfers (especially social pensions) assume critical importance, but
more frequently these are converted into informal transfers through a redistribution within
households.  Grand parents spending their pension on school fees of grand children is one
such common redistributive practice within households.  Paradoxical as it may appear, in
a  drought  situation,  the  most  vulnerable  households  are  those  without  any  single
vulnerable group (such as the elderly).
9.  Some of the informal transfers are reciprocal -- gifts at weddings, contributions to
the cost of funerals,  and interest-free loans from relatives and neighbors. T. Naeraa et. al.
note that in eastern Caprivi, every month or so a family member would  send the needy
family money or food such as a bag of maize meal. Unfortunately, the totality of informal
transfers are not captured in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (1993-94).
However,  it  is  possible  to  document  the  role  of  one  major  informal  transfer,  viz.,
remittances  received  from  family  members  employed  in  the  formal  economy.  The
Household Survey confirms the role of cash remittances (Table 1).  A higher proportion of
urban households (6 percent) depended mainly on cash remittances than rural households
5(3 percent).  A much higher proportion of households in Erongo, Kunene, Hardap,  and
Ohangwena  seem to  depend on  cash transfers  as  their  main  source  of  income  than
households in other regions, suggesting a high outmigration of adult men and women to
urban  areas for work.  Income inequality ratios (Ginis) with and without  private cash
remittances were  estimated; there appears to  be  no significant difference implying that
while private  cash  remittances may be  critical for  the  poor,  their  role  in  inequality-
reduction is miniimal.
B.  Formal transfers.
10.  From the perspective of impacts on the poor, by far the most important formal
transfer is the social pension.  All individuals who have crossed 60 years of age receive a
pension  of  N$160  per  month.  A  number  of  cash  transfers  are  available for  other
vulnerable groups including the disabled, orphaned children, and other children in need.
Institutions taking care of the elderly receive a subsidy; housing apartments with defaulters
are  compensated by a  remission of  defaulted rent,  and  abused  children are  placed  in
custody of other families  which are provided with a "place of safety grant".
11.  Provision of shelter and housing has been given prominence in public policy since
Independence.  The country's  "Build  Together"  program  has  won many international
Awards as an exaLmple  of joint efforts of government and communities to build affordable
housing.  Upgrading of informal squatter settlements -- a legacy of apartheid -- is also
stressed.  Much of this activity is driven by concessional loans by the government.
6Table 1: Households By Main Source of Income, Region and Rural/Urban Areas,
1993-94
Region  Main Source Of Income  Total
Subsistence  Wages  in  Business  Pensions  Cash
farming  cash  Remittances
Caprivi  Number  7,580  5,506  870  2,022  906  16,884
%  45  33  5  12  5  100
Erongo  Number  418  12,092  462  1,885  1,690  16,611
%  3  73  3  11  10  100
Hardap  Number  228  8,573  851  1,980  889  12,521
%  2  68  7  16  7  100
Karas  Number  268  7,885  810  2,010  474  11,545
%  2  68  7  17  4  100
Khomas  Number  87  28,049  2,921  1,907  1,137  34,101
%  0  82  9  6  3  100
Kunene  Number  2,350  4,510  1,476  1.341  670  10,398
%  23  43  14  13  6  100
Ohangwena  Number  18,209  1,544  587  3,796  1,437  25,574
%  771  6  2  15  6  100
Okavango  Number  13,099  4,737  737  1,308  514  20,394
%  64  23  4  6  3  100
Omaheke  Number  1,724  4,761  631  1,717  324  9,157
%  19  52  7  19  4  100
Omusati  Number  17,071  2,156  507  1,942  84  21,822
%  78  10  2  9  0  100
Oshana  Number  13,364  6,169  1,739  2,141  774  24,198
%  44  25  7  9  3  100
Oshikoto  Number  9,788  4,427  531  3,483  503  18,795
%  52  24  3  19  3  100
Otjozondjupa  Number  863  16,953  1,785  2,971  1,155  22,827
%  4  74  8  9  5  100
NAMIBIA  Number  85,050  107,362  13,909  27,602  10,556  244,827
%  35  44  6  11  4  100
Rural  Number  83,382  43,474  7.357  21,990  5,421  161,962
%  51  27  5  14  3  100
Urban  Number  1,668  63,889  6,551  5,612  5,135  82,864
%  2  77  8  7  6  100
Note: There  is a small  group  "Other"  of the  variable  "Main  Source  of income"  representing  0.1  % of the  households.
This  group  is not  presented  in the table.
Definition:
Region  and  ruraVurban:  See  table  3.1
Main  source  of income:  The  classification  of the  households  mi main  source  of  income  is based  on  the answer  to  the
question  "What  is the  main  source  of  income  of this  household  i.e. what  is most  important  for  the well-being  of the
entire  householdT'
Source: Living Conditions  in Namibia  (1996),  Central Statistical  Organization.
12.  A program of social security covering death/retirement benefit, maternity leave and
sick leave has been introduced, and a Social Security Commission was established. It is a
7contributory program, and as of now there has been no commitment of government (tax-
payer) funds.  It  is largely targeted  to  workers in the formal sectors,  though the self-
employed are welcome to join.
13.  Of the transfers with a work requirement, food-for-works  and/or cash-for-works
have been the dominant programs during periods of drought.  More  recently, a  labor-
based  works  program  has  been  in  operation  on  an  experimental basis  in the  North.
However,  pure  transfer  programs  administered by the  Department  of  Social  Welfare
account for over 90 percent of total spending.
III.  Transfers Without a Work Requirement
A.  Social pensions.
14.  Without doubt,  social pensions contribute significantly to  household income and
poveity reduction (Morgan, 1991).  According to the Household Income and Expenditure
Survey (1993-94), social pensions are the main source of income for  14 percent of rural
households, and 7 percent of urban households (Table 1).  Even for the households with
subsistence farming as the main source of income (35 percent  of total households), the
contribution of pensions at margin is substantial.  For well over half of the population of
Namibia, most of whom are poor,  social pension constitutes  an indispensable source of
household income.
15.  Pension level.  Prior  to  Independence, whites  received a  pension of R382  per
month whereas 90 percent of blacks received a minimum pension  of R55.  During the
post-Independence period, pensions were equalized and the minimum was at N$135 per
month in 1994, which was roughly adjusted for inflation  to the present level of N$160.  In
81991,  N$92  per  month  was  estimated  as  sufficient to  support  fully the  nutritional
requirements of three adults (Morgan, 1991): a notional food poverty line.  At  1996 July
prices, this works out to  N$154.  A pension of N$160 is thus sufficient for  a family of
three to stay above the poverty line 2.
16.  Exclusion  and  inclusion  errors.  The  program,  however,  suffers from  several
shortcomings.  First, the  coverage,  defined as  persons  actually receiving pensions as
percent of  eligible pensioners, is now 88 percent for the country as a whole.  Regional
break-up of the distribution of eligible persons and those actually receiving pensions is not
available for any recent year.  In order to  know the regional distribution of  exclusion
errors, the data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey were retabulated. 3
Persons (households) receiving pensions -- whether or not as the main source of income --
are shown as percentage of total number of persons 60 years or older in the survey (Table
2).  For the country as a whole, only about half of eligible sample households actually
received a pension.  It is worth noting that the survey year was 1993 and the situation has
clearly improved since then.  However, the regional variations in coverage are of some
interest.  The coverage of eligible households ranged between 30 to 45 percent in the five
Northern provinces -- the lowest in the country.  Even if total coverage has improved, it
is quite possible that the exclusion errors continue to plague the Northern provinces.  One
of the reasons for  inadequate coverage  of the  poor  in  the North  is  that  the  regional
2 This does  not necessarily  imply  that  the pension  is generous.  The sociology  of rural  Namibia  suggests
the preponderance  of extended  families,  typically  of a size exceeding  5, with only  one earning member.
For nearly  20 percent of families,  social  pension is the only  source  of income.
3 With  the permission  of the National  Planning Commission,  I have  accessed  the Household  Income  and
Expenditure  Survey. All the retabulations.  Ginis,  and some minor ratios were done with generous  help of
Mr. Weerasinghe  of the Central  Statistical  Organization.
9distribution  of social workers  -- the  officials responsible for ensuring the  coverage  of
eligible  pensioners -- is more favorable in the South than in the Northern provinces (Table
3).  In the Khomas (Windhoek Region), one social worker posted serves a population of
7,264 whereas in Omusati, with a population of about 182,000, not a single social worker
was posted.  In Okavango, two social workers were filled instead of the seven sanctioned
so that one worker looks after a population of about 60,0004. As of mid-1997, there were
31 unfilled social worker posts in the Northern regions, and just 9 in the remainder of the
country.  Considering that the North accounts for disproportionately large numbers of the
poor, the overall poverty-reducing impact of social pensions is thus muted.
17.  Because the program is universal, most elderly non-poor individuals especially in
urban Namibia also  receive social pensions.  Moreover,  the relatively well-educated,
urban-based and rnon-poor  individuals are better aware of the procedures and paper work
(see below) required to  draw the social pension.  About a half of the 90,000 pensioners
may be regarded  as non-poor.  According to  the Department of  Social Welfare, non-
receipt of social pension for the well-off pensioners is an unlikely event.
4 A simple linear regression  analysis  yielded  the following  results:
Y (% receiving  social  pensions)  = 6.25-0.00018*  Population  per one social  worker  post filled.
(-2.2.)
*Coefficient  significant  at 5% level;  adjusted  R2 0.26.
10Table 2:  Social Pensions: Regional Variations in Coverage
Region  No. ofpersons  Persons receiving  Col. 3 as % of
60 years or older  social pension  Col. 2
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Caprivi  3,616  2,343  64.8
Erongo  4,457  3,204  72.0
Hardap  4,347  3,395  78.1
Karas  4,262  3,227  75.7
Khomas  5,703  3,744  65.6
Kunene  3,609  1,829  50.7
Okavango  16,740  6,442  38.5
Omaheke  4,412  2,629  60.0
Omusati  12,031  4,093  34.0
Oshana  10,508  3,248  30.9
Oshikoto  10,605  5,145  48.5
Otjozondjupa  6,031  2,896  48.0
Namibia  91,496  44,036  48.1
Retabulated from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1993-94.
18.  If all the non-poor  pensioners are reached, and if we generously assume that  a
maximum of about 70 percent of poor  pensioners are covered, then the program as  a
whole may not be contributing to a reduction of inequality, though still certainly playing a
poverty-reducing role.  To verify this proposition, the data of the Household Income and
Expenditure Survey were retabulated, and Ginis of household incomes with and without
pensions are estimated.  There appears to be virtually no difference between the Lorenz
curves (Figure 2).  While the Gini inclusive of pensions is 0.69, the Gini without pensions
is 0.701, implying that the current design and implementation of the social pension scheme
is not contributing to a reduction in inequality. Interestingly, the income/welfare position
of those  relying heavily on cash remittances (Gini, mean income) is about the same as
those relying on social pensions.  However,  neither private cash remittances nor  social
pensions are contributing much to  a  reduction of inequality.  What this  means is that
Namibia's income inequality-driven  fundamentally by social/ethnic forces-is  so deep-
11rooted that it is unlikely to be corrected quickly by either publicly-funded programs or by
private (intra-family) charity.
19.  In  order  that the  social pension program  contributes to  poverty  as well as to
inequality reduction, it seems desirable not only to include all the eligible poor pensioners
(thus avoiding the exclusion errors --  see para 16 above), but  perhaps also to  exclude
many of the non-poor from the purview of the scheme. To begin with, it may be preferable
to adopt indicator-based criteria (such as ownership of a vehicle, or a single family home,
all those  paying income tax, and/or contributing to  social security, etc.) to  exclude the
clearly non-poor  individuals from  eligibility to  the social pension program.  Since the
required  information base  is  strong  in  urban  Namibia,  the  consequential increase  in
administrative cost  could  be  minimal while  the  gain  in  resource  savings  could  be
substantial.
Table 3: Regional Distribution of Social Worker Posts
Region  Population  Present  Population  Population
(1991)  Distribution Of  Per  Per One Sw
Sw Post  Post Filled
Posts  Filled
Northeast  Caprivi  90,422  5  2  1: 18,084  1: 45,211
Okavango  116,830  7  2  1:16,690  1: 58,415
Northwest  Osharna  134,884  10  6  1:13,488  1: 22,481
Ohangwena  179,634  6  0  1: 29,939  0: 179,634
Omusati  189,919  7  0  1: 23,740  0: 189,919
Oshikoto  128,745  4  3  1 :32,,186  1: 42,915
Central  Erongo  55,470  9  8  1:  6,163  1: 6,934
Otjozondjupa  102,536  12  6  1:  8,545  1: 17,090
Kunene  64,017  7  2  1:  9,145  1: 32,009
South  Khomas  167,071  21  23  1:  6,961  1: 7,264
(5)  (4)
Omaheke  52,735  3  3  1: 17,578  1: 17,578
Karas  61,162  7  6  1:  8,737  1: 10, 194
Hardap  66,495  9  8  1:  7,388  1: 8,312
Total  1,409,920  112  73  1: 12,500
Source:  Department  of Social  Welfare  Figures  in brackets  are social workers  posted at headquarters,
Windhoek.
12Figure 2:  Lorenz curve of the incomes of the
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20.  Fraud  One  problem  duly recognized  by the  program  administrators  is fraud.
Instances of children and grandchildren drawing pensions of parents and grandparents long
dead is not infrequent.  The pensioner can always authorize some one else to  receive the
pension on his behalf.  After the demise of the pensioner, the authorized person continues
to  draw the pension.  Even when no  such authorization exists, it has been found that
people routinely bring the identification cards of deceased persons and draw pension.  It is
difficult to check such fraud especially when the cash payment points are over-crowded
(see below).
21.  Inefficient administration and transaction costs to recipients.  Most pensioners in
rural  Namibia  do  not  have  Bank  accounts;  so  cash  needs  to  be  carried  closer  to
households.  In the past, carrying huge amounts of cash to villages has created problems
including robbery, misappropriation, etc.  To overcome this problem, the Department has
privatized cash  distribution in some provinces by hiring Cashmaster Payment  Services
13(CPS), a private company.  But this has created new problems.  The CPS would typically
economize on the number of distribution points so that pensioners have to  travel  long
distances  -- often incurring substantial transport costs -- to the distribution point. 4 The
number of pay lpoints were reduced with the  implementation of the  new CPS  system.
Very  old  and/or  handicapped  pensioners  and  single  women  looking  after  young
grandchildren, are particularly at a disadvantage.
22.  The  procedures  for registration are also  complex  and  documentation-intensive.
Those wishing to claim the pension have to submit a birth certificate and a certificate of
Namibian citizenship.  Many pensioners experience difficulties in registering themselves
because they do not possess birth certificates nor IDs; quite a few of them are very old and
immobile, physically disabled or otherwise unable to  travel long distances to  obtain the
necessary documents.  The computer verification by the CPS paymasters has also created
problems because  some pensioners found their names missing due to  system faults but
when the problems were rectified, they were not paid for the missed pensions. Insisting on
both  an  ID  and  also  on  computer  verification appear  to  be  an  "overkill":  it creates
obstacles  for  genuine  pensioners  to  draw  pensions  without  necessarily  preventing
fraudulent claims.  Thus the actual functioning of the system is imposing considerable
transaction costs to the recipients.
23.  Cost-effectiveness.  The budget  document  for  the  Department  Social Welfare
provide  information  separately  for  the  amount  of  transfers  (pensions  and  child
4Field  visit  to the North  has  confirmed  that many  pensioners  travel  distances  of 50  to 100  kms  incurring
considerable  transportation  charges.  The  real  value  of the  pension  (net  of transport  costs)  is often  much
lower  than  the nominal  value  of  N$160.  Some  pension  distribution  points  serve  as many  1,500
pensioners,  resulting  in overcrowding,  long  queues  and delays.
14maintenance grants), and total cost of administration which includes staff costs, transport,
etc.  We have used these numbers to estimate the cost of administration (as defined above)
as  percent  of  the  value  of  the  transfer.  We  have  not  been  able  to  estimate  these
exclusively for social pensions.  Pensions account for 90 percent of the total budget of the
department; we adjusted the costs proportionately. 5
24.  Prior  to  entering  into  a  contract  with  the  CPS,  i.e.,  for  the  year  1995, the
administrative cost of the program amounted to 7 percent of the value of the pension -- a
modest percent by international standards.  In other words,  for every N$160, about N$11
were spent on the cost of delivery. But the situation has dramatically changed following
the hiring of CPS.  The actual number of pensioners reached is not available for 1996-97.
Assuming that all the eligible pensioners were reached -- a clearly unrealistic assumption -
- the administrative cost would have jumped to  14 percent during 1996-97.  But if only as
many pensioners  were  served in  1996-97 as  in the  previous  year  --  a  more realistic
assumption -- the cost would have amounted to  36 percent  of the value of the transfer.
The reason for the sharp escalation of cost appears to be that even after the privatization
of the actual cash distribution function, there has been no contraction of the staff of the
Department.
25.  Universal coverage andfiscal  sustainability.  Can the social pension scheme be
fiscally sustainable over the medium-run in its present form as a universal entitlement for
all those who have reached the age of 60?  According to the population projections of the
National Planning Commission, the number of the elderly is likely to grow at 0.8 percent
per year over the period 1995-2005.  In other words, over 800 persons will be added each
5 This adjustment  is unlikely  to significantly  alter  the argument/numbers  discussed  here.
15year  to  the  number  of  recipients  of  the  social  pension,  costing  the  government  an
additional N$1.54 million per annum. The rate of increase in the pension budget of the
Directorate would be 0.8 percent per annum. During 1996-97, the social pension program
alone costed the  government  3.7  percent  of total  budgetary  expenditure. The  current
projections  of  the  government  show  that  by  31st  March,  1998,  total  government
expenditure may exceed  own  revenues by  12.1 percent.  Considering the  potentially
worsening budget deficit situation, an annual rate of increase in the pension budget of 0.8
percent does not appear to be fiscally sustainable.
26.  It  seems desirable to  contain the total  cost  of the social pension scheme at its
present level.  Can this be done without hurting the poor?  It appears feasible to extend
the  coverage  of  the  scheme  to  poor  pensioners in  the  North  who  are  currently  not
enrolled, but denying it to many of the non-poor in urban areas.  In this way, the total
number of pensioners can be frozen at least until all the poor pensioners are fully covered.
As indicated above, appropriate re-deployment of the staff of the Directorate can ensure
that the social pension be targeted without a further escalation of the administrative cost
of the  scheme.  Potential for  re-deployment of the resources  of the Directorate  exists
because  (a)  the cash  distribution  function is  gradually being privatized,  and  (b)  staff
resources  may be  freed for  administering the  pension program  if  some  of  the  other
programs such as the remission of rent are abolished (see  discussion below).  Once all
poor  pensioners are covered  (without an  increase in the  administrative cost),  and the
scheme is targeted to them, the annual rate of increase of the pension budget may be no
more than 0.2 percent  --  a fiscally sustainable scenario.
16B  Disability pensions.
27.  About  3  percent  of  the  population  of  Namibia  (44,000)  are  persons  with
disabilities.  The Government programs  include rehabilitation, disability prevention, and
logistical and  financial support.  The  Department  of  Social Welfare  administers  the
pension scheme for the disabled and the blind person's grants.
28.  That the administration of the program leaves much to be desired is evident from
its coverage.  During 1995, the total  number of persons receiving disability pension and
pension for the blind are 10,093 and 11,114, respectively.  The numbers may have slightly
increased  during  1996, but  are  nevertheless  only  a  small proportion  of  people  with
disabilities. Moreover, the regional distribution of the persons receiving pensions (Table
4) suggests that the program is not reaching the eligibles in some regions.  Thus, in many
Regions none are reported to be receiving the blind person's  grants.  Of a total  14,212
blind persons in the  country, only about  7 percent are currently receiving the pension.
Hardly any females among the blind are receiving the grants.
Table 4:  Number of Persons Receiving Disability Pension (1994/1995)
Social  Services  Office/Region  Total  Female  Male
Disability  Blind  Disabilitv  Blind  Disability  Blind
Pension  Pension  Pension  Pension  Pension  | Pension
Bushmanland  I  0  0  0  1  0
Gobabis:  Omaheke  Region  630  13  291  9  339  4
Grootfontein  64  0  14  0  50  0
Katima Mulilo  303  76  195  25  108  51
Keetmanshoop  (Karasregion)  1078  7  - - - -
Okahandja  89  1  32  0  57  0
Okakarara  78  6  31  1  47  5
Okamatapapti  8  0  5  0  3  0
Okombahe  116  0  43  0  63  0
Omanuu  25  0  14  0  11  0
Omatjete  52  0  14  0  97  0
Opuwo  (Kaokoland)  127  0  30  0  97  0
Ondangwa  (North  West  Region)  3109  641  - -
Otavi  25  0  7  0  18  0
Continued....
17Cont...  Table  4: Number  of Persons  Peceiving  Disability  Pension  (1994/1995)
Social Services  Office/Region  Total  Female  Male
Disabilitv  Blind  Disabilitv  Blind  Disability  Blind
Pension  Pension  Pension  Pension  Pension  Pension
Otjimbingwe  88  0  30  0  58  0
Otjituuo  41  2  25  0  27  0
Otjiwarongo  165  0  67  0  98  0
Outjo  115  1  43  0  72  1
Rehoboth  832  18  - - - -
Rundu  801  234  - - - -
Tsumeb  125  0  0  0  2  0
Tsumkwe  2  0  0  0  2  0
Windhoek  2219  22  - - - -
TOTAL  10093  1021  887  35  1141  61
Source: These numbers  were made  available  by the Social  Pension  Office  Windhoek,  as cited in Barbro-Isabel
Bruhns  et al (1995).
29.  Even those registered for pension seem to be experiencing difficulties in actually
receiving it (Barbro-Isabel Bruhns, et.  aL  1995).  Researchers  have noted  numerous
problems, including rnost importantly the fact that the pay procedures are so complex that
a "lot of money disappears and is very difficult to  trace" (page 55, op. cit.)  Information
about the procedures for registration and payment are not known to many eligible persons.
After a  careful  analysis of the  situation based  on  extensive  field work,  Barbro-Isabel
Bruhns  et  al.  (1995)  note that  "a  clear  policy and  well-distributed information  on
disability pension is needed." (page 56).
C  Child andfamily  allowances.
30.  Namibia has three grants targeted to  children:  maintenance grant, foster parent
grant, and place of safety grant.  All the three grants are administered by the Department
of Social Welfare.
1831.  Maintenance grant  consists of a  parent's  grant  (N$160)  and a children's grant
(N$60 per child for the first three children). Parent's  grant is given only to single women
who either have never been married, or are divorced, or widowed or has been deserted by
her husband for a period of 3 months or longer; or to women whose husband is in receipt
of a social pension; or whose husband has been certified to be unfit for remunerative work,
or is imprisoned.  However, for unclear reasons, a  parent's  grant is not  payable to  a
woman who is in receipt of a social pension.  It is means-tested inasmuch as the parent's
income should not exceed N$500 per month. No children's grant is payable to any parent,
unless such parent is a woman placed in the circumstances described above, or a man who
is in receipt of a social pension.  Several supporting documents are needed, including birth
certificate, marriage certificate, school report, death certificate, etc.
32.  The regional  distribution  of the beneficiaries (Table  5)  suggests that  very few
children in the North  are receiving these grants, whereas Khomas (Windhoek) accounts
for  a  disproportionately  large number of beneficiaries.  It  is difficult to  analyze the
distributional/ethnic or racial incidence of these grants  owing to  data constraints.  It  is
clear, however, that the majority of Namibians are not even aware of these grants (just one
child/parent receiving it in Okavango).  These grants can be extremely helpful for single
women with young children especially in poor  regions of the North.  In practice, most
rural  and  uneducated  women  are unable  to  furnish  written  proofs  and  a  variety  of
documents.  Enormous  delays are common. 6 Not  surprisingly, at  present the  grants
appear to be availed of by the urban middle class and the rich.  A particularly worrisome
feature is that the child maintenance grants were not reaching adequately the most needy
6 During  the  field  visit.  women  complained  about  delays  ranging  from 18  to 24 months.
19group (but not necessarily "eligible" by current laws): grandparents looking after children
of AIDS-affected parents, or those looking after the disabled children.  This is a unique
informal safety net, and deserves to be strengthened by child maintenance grants and by
suitable modification of the laws and effective implementation.
33.  Foster parent grants are given to any person who undertakes the temporary care
of any child who has been placed in his/her custody.  An amount of N$220 (N$160 per
foster parent and N$60 per foster child) per month is granted; and there is no restriction
on the number of children. Like the maintenance grant, the regional distribution is skewed
in favor of relatively developed regions, the North receiving almost nothing (Table 5).
20Table 5:  Children's Grants: Beneficiaries and Budgeted Spending
Maintenance  Grant  Foster  Parent  Grant
Region  No. of  Amount budgeted  No. of  Amount budgeted
Beneficiaries  for 1996-97  Beneficiaries  for 1996-97
(N$)  (N$)
Karas  429  634,200  186  72,288
Hardap  755  1,021,440  193  74,880
Khomas  972  1,682,520  133  67,680
Omaheke  264  438,480  18  5,184
Erongo  110  218,400  18  9,216
Otjozondjupa  248  427,560  29  18,720
North-West  15  25,200  4  1,152
Kunene  92  171,360  2  576
Okavango  1  840  1  288
Caprivi  0  0  0  0
Total  2,886  4,620,000  584  249,984
Source:  Directorate of Social Welfare, Windhoek.
34.  A place of safety grant is awarded for very brief periods to  any family willing to
accept a child found in difficult situations or is being abused.  The amount approved is
N$10 per child per day.
35.  All the three grant programs are good in theory, but seem to suffer from numercus
implementation problems due to limited administrative capacity, and appear to be heavily
urban-biased and pro-rich. By the very nature of conditions of eligibility, only children of
single women can hope to receive a maintenance grant.  About one-third of the families
are headed by women in Namibia.  Approximately a third of the children under age 15, or
about 200,000, may be living in female-headed households.  At present, the total  number
of children receiving maintenance and foster parent grants is no more than 3,500, or about
2 percent of the children living in female-headed households.  The total  expenditure on
these grants during 1996-97 is budgeted to be N$5.2 million, or 0.001 percent of the total
government current account expenditure.  If all vulnerable children --  estimated to  be
approximately 10 percent of the children in female-headed households --  are covered by
21maintenance grants, fiscal sustainability  may still not emerge as a serious issue.  But abuse,
pro-rich and urban bias are likely to plague the program.
36.  The reasons  for  urban, pro-rich bias stem from the  fact that  the program was
introduced to  serve the white population prior to  Independence.  The program has never
been adapted to fiit in with the realities of post-Independent  Namibia.  Besides, it is not
clear to  what  ext,ent these grants  are acting as an  obstacle  to  responsible parenthood.
Government programs should not encourage men and women to  stay away from making
payments for child maintenance.  Though it is not  possible to  document with numbers,
unstructured  interviews during field visits suggest that cases of parents deliberately not
paying for child maintenance, even when they are able to financially, are common. The lax
implementation of child maintenance grant is reported  to  be widespread in urban areas.
These grants  may be retained since the fiscal implications do not  appear to  be serious.
However,  efforts  should  also  be  made  to  enforce  the  laws  governing
marriage/divorce/child  maintenance, so  that  the  burden  of  rearing  children is  shared
equally between the  spouses, and in no case is passed  on to  the state  simply because
maintenance grants exist.
37.  Another issue worth stressing is who should receive the maintenance grant:  the
parent usually living in urban areas, or the grandparent  actually looking after the child in
rural areas.  In theory (and according to law), the person actually looking after the child
should be the recipient of the maintenance grant.  In practice, however, it appears that the
grants  are being received by parents living in urban areas, and not by the grandparents
22who bear the burden of rearing children in rural areas.  This is no doubt an implementation
issue, but deserves some attention.
D.  Other subsidies.
38.  Subsidies to welfare organizations.  A number of  private welfare organizations
look after the aged and the handicapped.  The majority of such private organizations are
located in towns (5 in Windhoek).  The formula for the calculation of the subsidy varies
from one type of welfare organization to another, but roughly the Government bears about
30 percent of the actual expenditure.  The program is administered by the Department of
Social Welfare.
39.  No data on the income profiles of the actual beneficiaries are available, but  it is
well-known that only the rich can afford to gain admission into these privately-run  welfare
homes.  Serious problems are currently being encountered in the actual administration of
these subsidies (Department of Social Welfare, 1997).  The organizations are either over-
or under-paid, and there appears to be no proper audit or check.
40.  Remission  of  rent.  The Department of Social Welfare assists the local authority
with the rent and service fee of the needy.  The scheme is confined to urban towns. In
actual practice,  the  scheme  provides for  remission of  rent  of  those  who  defaulted  .
Although an investigation into the socio-economic condition of those defaulted needs to
be done by social workers, the claims are usually granted upon submission of a report by
municipalities or  local authorities.  During 1996-97, an amount of N$2.3 million would
have been paid to local authorities on this account.  The main problem with the program
is in a majority of cases the beneficiaries are in a position to  pay their own rent; so this
23expenditure is virtually a transfer to the non-poor.  Besides, the program is believed to be
generating a moral hazard  problem --  many default because they  are aware that  the
Government pays for the defaulted amount.
41.  School-feeding program.  The Ministry of Basic Education  and Culture runs a
school-feeding program.  The  institutions covered  include the  primary  schools,  pre-
schools, private hostels, and informal hostels.  An amount of N$2.8  million was spent
during  1996-97.  In  addition,  bilateral  donors  provide  milk powder  and  oil.  The
distribution by institutions/students is shown in Table 6.  The primary schools account for
the bulk of spending and coverage.
Table 6: Namibian  School  Feeding  Program: Institutions and Beneficiaries, 1997
Number  of  Beneficiaries
, Tnstitution  Number  Total  Pupils  Teacher  Cooks  Total  Dry  Total  Weekly
Institution  Pupils  &  Rations  Rations  Rations
Hostel
Staff
Primary schools  413  99,145  65,844  689  1,057  67,590  3,171  70,761  353,805
Pre-schools  153  6,910  6,839  250  188  7,277  564  7,841  39,205
Private hostels  62  9,326  9,326  0  276  9,602  0  9,602  67,872
Informal hostels  56  7,746  6,010  0  132  6,142  396  6,538  58,842
Informal  hostels  6  1,044  553  0  13  566  39  566  4,800
690  124,171  88,572  939  1,666  91,177  4,170  95,308  524,524
Source:  Ministry of Basic Education and Culture
42.  The  regional/town/municipalities of  the  primary  school  feedings  --  the  most
dominant program -- is shown in Table 7.  Three towns -- Keetmanshoop, Ondangwa  and
Windhoek -- account for over half of the beneficiaries reflecting that the program is highly
skewed towards urban areas.  Moreover, most students in (expensive) private hostels may
be expected to belong to  relatively well-off households.  It is doubtful if the program is
pro-poor; it is certainly not equitable between rural and urban areas.
24Table 7: Namibian  School Feeding Program: Regional Break-up of Primary School Beneficiaries,
1997
Number  of Beneficiaries
Region  Number  Total  Pupils  Teacher  Cooks  Total  Dry  Total  Weekly
Schools  Pupils  &  Rations  Rations  Rations
Hostel
Staff
Katima Mulilo  27  4,149  3,662  49  62  3,773  186  3,959  19,795
Keetmanshoop  75  22,249  14,829  111  232  15,172  696  15,868  79,340
Khorimas  35  13,768  7,036  60  112  7,208  336  7,544  37,720
Ondangwa  East  74  15,179  13,294  121  207  13,622  621  14,243  71,215
Ondangwa  West  23  4,348  4,348  46  65  4,459  195  4,654  23,270
Opuwo  40  7,384  5,427  63  82  5,572  246  5,818  29,090
Rundu  74  5,122  4,867  131  125  5,123  375  5,498  27,490
Windhoek  65  26,946  12,381  108  172  12,661  516  13,177  65,885
413  99,145  65,844  689  1,057  67,590  3,171  70,761  353,805
Source:  Ministry  of Basic Education  and Culture
E.  Social Assistance  Transfers: A Summary
43.  Namibia has a number of social assistance transfer programs covering practically
every type of vulnerability -- old age, disability, single parenthood, spousal or child abuse,
etc.  For  1996-97, an amount of N$189.9 million is budgeted for these programs (Table
8).  It amounted to 4.5 percent of total Government current expenditure, or 2.3 percent of
GDP.
44.  Seven main findings follow from the above empirical analysis:
*  Both the formal and informal safety nets are critical for the poor in Namibia.
*  The country has too many programs, with only a limited capacity to administer.
*  Some programs are clearly not serving poverty-reduction goals, and some are
grossly abused (e.g., remission of rent and subsidies for institutional care).
*  The  main programs  of  social  pension  and  disability pension  are  currently
playing a poverty-reducing role.  However, since these transfers are universal,
their long-run fiscal sustainability is in doubt.  Moreover, the programs suffer
from  numerous problems including exclusion errors,  inclusion errors,  fraud,
heavy transaction costs for the recipients, and other problems associated with
cash  payments  especially  in  far-flung  regions.  Privatization  of  cash
25disbursement has not resolved these problems.  The cost of administration has
dramatically increased since the last year.
•  Adverse incentives for work do not appear to be a problem.  However, moral
hazard problems, and individuals abandoning personal responsibility, seem to
be issues requiring attention especially for the program of child maintenance
grant.  The program also suffers from pro-rich and pro-urban bias.
*  Practically every program suffers from regional asymmetry.  Program coverage
is most definitely inadequate in the North where the poorest are concentrated.
. Finally,  publicly-funded programs  are  only  inadequately  contributing  to  a
strengthening  of  the  informal safety  net.  Moreover,  some  programs  are
wittingly or  unwittingly doing  the  opposite,  viz., financing formal  welfare
institutions that  are  least likely to  house  the  needy poor  individuals in the
country.
26Table 8:  Social Assistance Transfers in Namibia:  A Summary
Beneficiaries  Budget
Number  1996/97  1997/19
(Estimated,  NA/fonltW  (Appropriated)  (Planned)
Allowance,  Grants, Subsidiaries  Not Actual)  Beneficiary  NS million  NS
million
A.  Pensions, Allowances and Institutional Subsidies
1.  Pensions (Non Contributory)
1.1  Old Age Pension  82,670  160  158.74
1.2 Blind Person's  Pension  819  160  0.36
1.3 Disabled Person's  Pension  11,850  160  22.75
1.4 War Veteran's  Allowance  111  160  0.21
TOTAL  94,320  160  182.06  182.0
2.  Child and Family  Allowances
2.1  Foster Parent Grants  584  160  0.25
2.2  Maintenance Grant/  2,886  60/child  4.62
Family Allowance  160
2.3  Places of Safetv Allowance  c.a. 70  60/child  0.33
cases/month  N$10/
day child
TOTAL  5.20  5.8
3.  Subsidies  to institutions/welfare  16 institutions + 8 org.  NS 1,000  1.60  1.0
organizations  NS 4,000
4.  Remission of Rent  28 localities  c.a. N550  (budg.)  1.00
TOTAL  52,765 beneficiaries  max 80  (paid) 2.48  1.0
5.  Other allowances (to individuals
families)  (budg.) 0.04
5.1  Escort Fees  TOTAL  (paid) 0.004
Total Pensions,  Allowances  and  189.86  189.8
Institutional  Subsidies
*As a percentage of Current Govt Exp.  4.5
*As a percent of GDP  2.3
B.  Other  Programs
6.  School feeding program  2.8  N/A
7.  Shelter/housing  program  20.2  22.0
8.  Labor-based  work  programs  1.7  1.1
TOTAL  OTHER PROGRAMS  24.7  23.1
GRAND TOTAL: ALL PROGRAMS  214.6
*As a percentage of Current Govt Exp.  5.1
*As a percent of GDP  2.6
Source: Compiled from Situation Analysis, Directorate of Social Welfare; Minister  of Local Government and
Housing; Transport; and Basic Education and Culture.
27IV. Shelter/Housing
45.  Much of the housing  crisis in the country is a by-product of racial segregation  in
housing  that was imposed  on the people  prior to Independence. Since Independence,  the
Government  has encouraged housing finance through the private sector, a  parastatal,
National Housing Enterprises (NHE) and by direct involvement.  The Government's
Build-Together  (BT) housing  program seeks to assist low-income  households  who have
little access to pr'ivate  sector housing  finance,  or to the finance offered  by NHE.  While
NHE and the private sector caters to the non-poor,  the BT program targets households
with incomes  below N$1250 per month. About 60 percent of all urban households,  who
do not have  decent housing,  fall in this category.  By 1995-96,  the program has assisted
about 3400 families  with housing loans valued at N$42.5 million.  The average loan
amount was N$12,500 -- clearly inadequate for constructing a housing unit without
considerable  contribution  from the beneficiaries  themselves. The loans carry a positive
interest  rate ranging  from 9 to 14 percent,  depending  upon the size of the loan. However,
since  the market  rate of interest  is twice this level,  there is an implicit  subsidy.
46.  The impact  of the program  has been reported to be "impressive"  (National  Habitat
II Committee). Some women have built homes worth over N$25,000 with only a loan
amount of N$6,000. About 45 percent of beneficiaries  were female-headed  households.
The repayment  rates are high.  However, evaluations  (NEPRU 1996a; Onibokun  et al.
1995) have shown that the program is not reaching  the target groups, and is neither
financially  nor institutionally  sustainable.  Most beneficiaries  (80 percent) are in the
28category of "permanently employed" located predominantly in urban towns. The program
may not be reaching the poorest in rural areas adequately.
47.  The urban poor and the nonpoor are clearly benefiting from the housing programs.
But are the urban poor served disproportionately?  Up to 80 percent of the population in
the informal settlements in the urban north are unemployed (and most still have no security
of tenure)  and hence were unable to get any loans under the BT program (Inge Tvedten
and  M.  Mupotola,  1995).  Moreover,  from  the  perspective  of  the  urban  poor,  the
upgrading  of  squatters  and  provision  of  drinking water  are  more  of  a  priority  than
improving the low-cost housing stock.  During 1994-95, public expenditure on informal
settlement upgrading was nil; it was budgeted for  N$1.5 million during 1996-97, whereas
the  program of enhancing  new housing stock  received an  amount of N$11.5  million.
(Table  9)  Moreover,  historically Namibia's  water  and  sanitation services were  also
biased towards high quality provision to urban centers and commercial farms, and the bias
continues (S. Stone and M. Gaomab, 1994).
Table 9:  Summary Development Budget for Housing: 1994-95 to 1997/98
Name of Program  Actual Up to  Estimatedfor  Estimated  1997/98
1994/95  1995/96  Expenditure
1996/97
Urban/Rural Housing Sub-  43,385,000  11,000,000  11,550,000  11,700,000
Programmne
Social  Housing  Sub-  1,450,000  5,000,000  950,000  1,100,000
Programme
Windhoek  Single  Quarters  3,550,000  3,500,000  3,000,000  2,800,000
Sub-Programme
Informal  Settlement  1,250,000  1,500,000  1,700,000
Upgrading  Sub-Programme
Total  48,385,000  16,250,000  17,000,000  17,300,000
Source:  Ministry  of  Local  Government  and  Housing,  Government  of Namibia
2948.  These considerations suggest that a reorientation of public expenditure within the
housing sector towards  upgradation of squatter  settlements and provision of water  and
sanitation in urban areas, and expansion of affordable housing stock in rural areas, may be
needed.
49.  Namibia's  experience  in  shelter/housing  --  implicit  subsidies  reaching
disproportionately urban  non-poor  population --  is  similar to  the  experience of  other
countries that experimented with similar programs (K. Subbarao, et al,  1997).  In fact, of
all subsidies, housing subsidies have proven to be the most regressive.  It is very unlikely
that  the  historically  driven biases  in  housing  provision  can  be  corrected  by  direct
government (public sector) involvement without giving rise to new distortions and fiscal
sustainability issues.
V. Social Security  (Insurance)
50.  A Social Security Commission was established by the Parliament in  1994 with a
view to providing income security to Namibians.  A contributory Social Security system
was introduced  in  1995. The system provides for maternity leave, sick leave and death
benefits to its members.  It is based on a principle of 50-50 contribution from employers
and employees.  There  appears to  be  some implicit subsidy from the relatively higher
paying employers to lower paid employees, but it is too early to come up with quantitative
magnitudes.  As of July 1997, 23,720 employers and 232,725 employees have registered
themselves.  The income (from contributions) is now about N$4.5 million a month.  For
the first three months  of 1996-97 financial year, an amount of N$5.2 was disbursed by
30way of benefits.  The pension scheme is still in its infancy, but may grow in magnitude in
the  next five years.  Since the  inception of the  Funds,  maternity  leave benefits have
dominated.
51.  The  program  is  clearly  targeted  to  workers  in  the  formal  sectors  and  will
strengthen the already strong urban bias in social protection.  Social security -- whether
financed by employers or employees -- is most likely to act as an additional tax on labor
and can counteract policies to promote labor use in the country.
VI.  Transfers with a Work Requirement.
52.  Three types of transfers with a work requirement exist in the country: (a) Food-
or  Cash-for-Work  programs,  (b)  a  Labor-based  works  program,  and  (c)  Microcredit
programs (for expanding wage and/or self-employment in informal sectors and in small
scale enterprises).
A.  Food-  or Cash-for- Work Programs.
53.  These programs,  largely donor-funded,  have been  implemented during years of
drought.  The able-bodied are  generally ineligible for  free  food  distribution during  a
drought, and  therefore  participate in food-  or  cash-for-work  programs.  Considerable
experience on their working has been gained, and the programs  have been evaluated in
depth (A. Ashby et. al.  1996; S. Adkisen and S. Devereux  1995; S. Devereux 1995; S.
Devereux and  C.  Solomon  1994).  Instead of presenting  a detailed overview of these
evaluations, the main findings (which are broadly in conformity with the cross-country
evidence presented in K. Subbarao, et. al. 1997), are summarized below.
3154.  First, the program outreach has been inadequate.  Owing to inherent difficulties in
scaling  up  the  program  during  drought  periods,  the  proportion  of  the  able-bodied
participating in the program has been low.  One reason was the logistical problem created
by the distribution of food as wages.  Private food markets are well-developed in Namibia.
During a drought, food imports do reach the private retail outlets throughout the country.
Therefore, instead of food, use of cash or food vouchers (redeemable at private outlets) as
wages could have expanded the coverage of the program rapidly.  Replacing food by cash
or food vouchers appears highly desirable.
55.  Even where  cash  was  used,  the  program  suffered from  poor  targeting.  One
problem was that the equipment provided was free, and that attracted the non-poor to the
program in large numbers.  To  avoid mis-targeting of the program, the equipment would
be owned by local municipalities or institutions, or NGOs managing the program (instead
of individuals) and then be lent to  workers.  Another issue was the wage rate.  It was
usually set (both food and cash) at a level that attracted the nonpoor to the program, apart
from contributing to job rationing.
56.  The country  has no  regular  nation-wide works  program  during  normal times,
unlike in drought-prone regions of India.  A pilot labor-based program is in operation (see
next section). A more regular labor-based works program is highly recommended, because
all the administrative and institutional framework would then be in place.  With the onset
of  a  drought,  the  program  could  then  be  expanded  quickly  and  with  relative
(administrative) ease.
3257.  Administrative capacity of the government of Namibia is limited, and  is usually
very strained during periods of drought.  And experience suggests (K. Subbarao, et. al.
1997) that well-run works programs are usually administration-intensive. Therefore, it is
best to  develop capacity outside of the government --  through NGOs,  and the private
sector.  The experience of other African countries is helpful in this  context.  In  other
African countries (e.g., Ghana) public provision (funding) by the government (or donors)
was combined with private production (actual implementation of the program by a private
contractors or NGOs).
B.  Labor-based  works programs.
58.  Labor-based works have proven to  be economically and technically feasible and
appear to be an especially good option for drought-prone countries.  In Namibia, pilot
projects have been in operation in the North.  Recently, a Green Paper was written by a
group  of  technical experts  designed to  encourage  public debate  on  the  feasibility of
extending labor-based methods in all the activities of line Ministries.
59.  A critical review of the pilot projects in the North strongly favors the use of Labor-
based works as a vehicle for expanding employment and building infrastructure (especially
gravel-based  rural  roads)  in  the  country.  I  visited  an  ongoing  labor-based  road
construction worksite (Onethindi to Olukonda road in Oshikoto region).  The program is
being implemented by private contractors with the oversight of donor-funded specialists.
Four impressions of the visit to  the worksite can readily be noted:  (a) a high degree of
gender equality in hired labor 7,  (b) a reasonable proportion of (one-third) casual labor to
' Contractors  noted that under the task-based  system.  women  were actually  preferred  because  they were
able to complete  the tasks much  faster and more  efficiently  than men.
33skilled labor,  (c)  a  relatively low wage that  permitted  self-targeting, and  (d) technical
feasibility of the program as revealed by the good quality of the road constructed.
60.  Hard data on the economics of labor-based works in Namibia is limited. However,
the limited information that exists confirms the above impressions.  Thus, unskilled wage
cost as a percent of total wage cost was 30 percent in the Ombalantu/Omusati region, and
47 percent in Ongenga-Omungwelume worksite.  The total cost of labor-based project  is
61 percent of the equipment-based project,  in the same  region  and for  the same type
(quality) of road.  (ILO,  1995).  During April 1996 to March  1997, in the labor-based
project at Ombalantu/Omusati region, about 60,000 person days of low-wage employment
was created.
61.  Given  the  high  level of  unemployment, and  the  highly uncertain agro-climatic
environment, labor-based methods have a definite role to  play in Namibia's development.
The  pre-requisites  are:  development  of  private  contractor  capacity,  and  necessary
managerial skills required to run a labor-based program.  Bilateral donors (SIDA) and the
ILO are currently involved in this effort.  The Government has also shown considerable
interest as evidenced by the preparation of the Green Paper.  Nevertheless, the capacity
both  in the Government and in the private  sector to  design  and manage an expanded
labor-based works program appear to be limited.  The resources allocated for the program
in the Development Budget (barely N$1.7 million in 1996-97, and N$1.1 in 1997-98) may
appear inadequate in relation to the needs, but not in relation to the limited capacity in the
country.  However,  it seems highly desirable to  expand the capacity and the resources
34devoted to  the program. This is an area where more donor  involvement and technical
assistance may have rich pay-offs.
C  Microcredit/Informal  Sector Activities
62.  The Namibia Development Corporation (NDC), a parastatal, is charged with the
responsibility to provide credit for micro enterprises.  The NDC has a program of start-up
assistance to  help entrepreneurs  launch sustainable business  activities.  The  program
included credit, training and business counseling.  The amount  of start-up loans range
from N$1,000 to N$80,000, the average loan size being N$10,000.  The interest will be at
the going prime bank rate, and loans are to be repaid within five years.  No collateral or
own contribution is required,  but  the  purchased equipment will be  mortgaged  to  the
Corporation.  Over N$850,000 has been advanced as loans to 82 individuals or businesses.
63.  The Corporation's  activities are almost entirely (95 percent) urban.  Though no
quantitative information on  the  income profiles of  borrowers  is  available, it  is to  be
expected that  poor  people  with  low skill base  could have  hardly benefited from  this
program. Moreover, the available data suggest that the default rate is over 30-40 percent.
With such  a  high  default  rate,  the  Corporation's  business  is  clearly not  sustainable.
Already, the high default rate is creating a cash flow problem.  The cost of serving a loan
is also high at 30 percent of the loan amount.
64.  There is now  considerable evidence to  suggest that  in rural Namibia, the poor
require (demand) small amounts of loan (often N$100 to  N$500), frequent loans, and a
market place such as a  shed with basic amenities (A. Botelle,  1991; M. Seiche, 1995).
Credit at this small scale is being provided by local (Namibian) NGOs such as the Private
35Sector Foundation (PSF).  The PSF offers (appropriately) a less formal type of training
than the NDC, to those who engage themselves in subsistence type of informal business
activities. An interesting aspect of the functioning of NGO organizations such as the PSF
is that the business activities is not separated from other aspects of community.  Often,
group discussions are arranged to  discuss issues of healthcare and family planning.  The
program was successfully targeted to women (Table 10).  The average value of loan was
N$524 for women as N$554  for  men.  It  is worth  stressing, however,  that  even this
relatively  successful  NGO-run  credit  operation  is  heavily  concentrated  in  Khomas
(Windhoek), which accounted for about half of the value of loans.  The main constraints
to a rapid expansion of microcredit programs in rural Namibia appear to be on the demand
side.  It is hard for small businesses to  survive, much less thrive, in a low-income, rural,
stagnating region.
65.  Owing to limited time, and due to their dispersed nature, the credit activities of the
NGOs, parastatals and those of the Ministry of Industry could not be reviewed in depth.
However,  a  recent  study  has  reviewed  the  programs  in  depth.  (M.  Seiche,  1995).
Overall, the institutional efforts to  promote informal businesses are characterized by (a)
large-scale, urban-oriented operations, (b) separation of credit from business training, and
(c)  inadequate attention  to  marketing and  support  activities.  As  a  consequence,  the
growth potential of  informal business could not be exploited in full. Thus far, the best
efforts seem to  be those  of the NGOs, with the parastatal's  performance being neither
satisfactory nor even relevant to the needs of informal businesses in rural Namibia.
36Table 10:  Regional Distribution of Loans, August 1997
Region  Number of loans  Value of loans
Female  Male  Total  Female  Male  Total
N$  NS  N$
Caprivi  1  1  I  1
Erongo  126  7  133  62.8  3.5  66.3
Hardap  302  93  395  126.7  40.0  166.7
Karas  206  49  255  95.7  22.6  118.3
Khomas  1,002  216  1,218  556.9  135.6  692.5
Kunene  81  27  108  41.5  13.5  54.0
Ohangwena  0  0.0
Omusati  0  0.0
Oshana  443  83  52  251.9  48.8  200.7
Oshikoto  16  8  24  8.0  4.0  12.0
Okavango  0  0.0
Omaheke  17  17  8.2  8.2
Otjozondjupa  79  3  82  39.8  500.00  39.8
TOTAL  2,272  487  2,759  1,190.3  269.7  1,460.0
Percentage  82.35  17.65  100.00  81.53  18.47  100.0
Average value  523.390  553.72  529.16
Source:  Private Sector  Foundation,  August  1997.
VII.  Decentralization and transfer programs
66.  A  policy  decision  has  been  taken  to  gradually  decentralize  the  functional
responsibilities of  line  Ministries.  The  basic  long-term  goals  are  to  (a)  let  local
units/offices administer programs such as health care (functional decentralization), and (b)
create or strengthen sub-national levels of the Government that are broadly independent
from the national government with respect to defined functions including the right to raise
revenues in that locality (devolution).  According to the Ministry  of Local Government
and Housing directive of 12th December,  1996, primary health care, social services, and
resettlement/rehabilitation  will  be  in  a  group  of  "immediate"  or  "intermediate"
decentralization to Regional Councils or Local Authorities.
3767.  What does the decentralization process mean for the implementation of transfer
programs by the I)irectorate of Social Services? Our analysis has shown (a) considerable
regional  asymmetry  in  staffing, with  the  North  getting  relatively less  attention,  (b)
generally poor record in reaching the eligible  beneficiaries especially in the rural North, (c)
an escalation of the administrative cost in the recent period, and (d) lack of coordination
between different segments of the Directorate,  and between the  contributory and non-
contributory systems.
68.  The first  two  drawbacks can be  resolved if the  local  authorities are  given the
authority to implement the program, along with the budget allocated in proportion to the
eligible beneficiaries in each  Region.  The  development  of  a  cadre  of  administrative
support at the local and regional levels may not happen immediately. In the interim, it may
require a transfer of staff resources from Windhoek to the Regions.  Also, devolution of
funds may require a change (updating) of the current legislation.  Presumably due to these
reasons,  the  proposals  of  the  Directorate  currently  do  not  recommend a  transfer  of
budgetary  resources  to  the  local  authorities.  However,  the  above  problems can be
resolved with relative ease. Transferring responsibilities  to implement the program without
a  corresponding  transfer  of funds may not  be  the  best  way  to  reap the  gains  from
decentralization.  One  short run  solution to  the  problem  of inadequate  administrative
support at the local level would be a policy of sending staff from Windhoek to the regions
by rotation (say 3 to 6 months of work at a local office).  In the process, the staff working
at the Centre could also be enabled to develop regional expertise, so that at a future date,
staff  may be  transferred  to  the  Regions  keeping  their  preferences/expertise in  mind.
38Inadequate  local  administrative capacity  is  a  problem,  but  is  solvable  with  creative
redeployment of staff of the Directorate.
69.  The problem of increasing administrative cost  is a more difficult one, because it
may involve some  downsizing  of  the  Directorate.  This  issue  is  not  linked  to  the
decentralization process as such, but can be interfaced.  For example, staff found in excess
of the needs could be sent to the Regions currently understaffed (Table  3).  Alternatively,
some staff could be redeployed to  conduct means tests  and assist in the removal of the
non-poor pensioners from the program.  Also, some of the staff could be placed in charge
of means tests of the elderly currently under institutional care.  If staff are entrusted with
the  additional  responsibility  of  targeting  of  some  of  the  programs,  the  costs  of
administration can at least be matched by resource savings and downsizing may not be
warranted.
70.  One of the reasons for the high administrative cost  is that  work at all levels is
manually done.  Some  degree  of  computerization  and  reduction  of  paper  work  is
necessary to improve the overall efficiency of the Directorate.  The fact that information
on either the actual number of beneficiaries or the actual amount spent during the previous
financial  year is nowhere collated and stored electronically is suggestive of the slack in the
system.  The Department has to  make serious efforts to  develop a  proper management
information system.  Decentralization can provide an useful opportunity to develop such a
disaggregated management information system.
71.  Finally, targeting  of  social pensions  and  child  allowances  cannot  be  achieved
without the inputs of the community and the NGOs.  Community efforts in a country with
39a historical legacy of top-down  administration is unlikely to  emerge immediately, but  a
decentralized  pension  administration  provides  a  unique  opportunity  for  the  gradual
emergence of community initiatives.  Much of the Directorate's  functions involve direct
interface with people and institutions at the grass-roots level.  The Directorate  is also
charged with other responsibilities  of monitoring of the social situation and people's living
conditions ("social monitoring"), and needs assessment and reporting.  The present highly
centralized administration is at  odds with  the requirements of  efficient delivery of  the
mandate of the [irectorate.
VIII.  Reforni Options and Recommendations
72.  In the light of the above analysis, what options should the Government consider?
Twc approaches are possible, the first a short-term option, and a second more longer-term
option.  In the short run, the Government may reform the existing programs  of social
pension, child and disability allowances and implement the programs better: some specific
recommendations  towards  this  goal  are  outlined  below.  In  the  medium  run,  the
Government mav rethink the safety net programs more fundamentally in the direction of
new initiatives in the North where poverty is concentrated.  In particular, there is a greater
need to  develop capacity to  implement public works  programs (implemented preferably
with  private  contractors,  given the  limited capacity of the  Government),  and provide
incentives for the expansion of informal businesses in the countryside.  Considering that
over  90 of the country is arid with  highly fluctuating incomes, a  works  program that
provides both transfer benefits and consumption-smoothing appears to be consistent with
the profile of poverty and vulnerability.
4073.  A few specific recommendations are outlined below.
*  Reduce the number and complexity of programs.  At present, Namibia has a large
number of programs.  The Directorate of Social Services alone is administering nine
cash  transfer programs.  The programs  which  have no  direct bearing  on poverty
reduction, such as the remission of rent and blanket subsidies to welfare institutions,
need to be abolished. It seems highly  desirable to streamline and reduce the number of
programs to four: a basic social pension program, a disability pension program, a blind
person  grant,  and  a  child maintenance grant.  Such a  restructuring  would  release
resources -- both financial  and administrative -- which can then be re-deployed so that
the retained four programs are implemented effectively, avoiding exclusion errors. (see
below).
•  Pay  particular  attention  to  the  social  pension  program.  Special  attention  is
required to  administer the social pension program well, in view of its critical role in
poverty reduction.  Exclusion errors are particularly worrisome, especially since these
are  occurring  in  regions  with  the  highest  concentrations  of  poverty.  The  high
transaction costs (including transport costs) incurred by the poor, which greatly reduce
the real value of pensions, is also a source of concern.  Decentralization provides
an opportunity to remedy the observed deficiencies.  On a pilot basis (in regions such
as  Kunene),  identification  of  eligible  beneficiaries  may  be  done  by  local
authorities/regional  councils with  community  inputs.  Responsibility for  complete
program coverage be given to them,  and the performance evaluated a year later. It
41appears  desirable  to  decentralize  both  budgetary  control  and  program
implementation in the pilot regions.
*  Target social pensions on a pilot basis in urban areas.  From the perspective of
long-run fiscal sustainability, there appears to  be a good  case for targeting of social
pensions to the needy.  However, extreme caution is required to ensure that targeting
does not further  exacerbate the already high exclusion errors.  It  is best to test out
indicator-based targeting on a pilot basis in urban areas.  Excluding certain categories
(individuals  owning  vehicles,  independent  houses,  or  paying  income-tax  and/or
contributing to formal social security etc.,) appears to be a desirable way to proceed.
*  Coordinate  the  contributory  and  non-contributory  systems  so  as  to  reduce
overlap.
*  Strengthen the country's informal safety net (for example, by providing additional
relief to families looking after children of AIDS-affected parents, or disabled children).
3  Remove regional asymmetry in the outreach of programs.  All the major programs
are  currently  not  reaching many eligible persons  in  some  Regions  (especially the
North).  This  is  particularly  so for  disability pensions,  blind person's  grant  and
maintenance grants.  To improve coverage in far-flung Regions, some re-deployment
of administrative staff to under-served Regions would be required.  If limitations to
moving professional staff  between  regions  cannot  be  overcome,  other  options  of
reaching the underserved Northern regions (including the use of para-professionals)
may also need to be considered.
42*  Enforce  the  laws  governing  marriage/divorce/child  maintenance,  so  that  the
burden of rearing children is shared equally between the spouses.  At present, it seems
most likely that the government programs encourage spouses to avoid payments for
child maintenance.  The child maintenance programs  suffer not  so much from the
problem of fiscal sustainability, but more from abuse, and pro-urban and pro-rich bias.
*  Re-orient shelter/housing  programs.  Much  of  the  shelter  programs  are  urban-
biased,  and  pro-middle  class.  More  resources  need  to  go  to  the  programs  of
importance to the poorest  -- upgradation of single quarters, squatter settlements and
slums.  Government subsidy on loans seem to be helping the moderately-poor and the
non-poor, but not the poorest in rural areas.  Regional asymmetry is far the greatest in
housing/shelter programs.  Considering the potential for regressivity in the distribution
of government spending on housing/shelter, more government involvement needs to be
justified only if the various components of the program are rendered pro-poor and pro-
rural.  Considering that  even the Build-Together program is urban-biased and pro-
middle class, there appears to be no justification for the prevailing (implicit) subsidy on
the rate of interest.
. Invest  in  capacity-building  and  expand  the  labor-based  works  program.  It
appears highly desirable to invest in training of small-scale contractors  and managers
to expand the labor-based works program on a priority basis.  Resources and efforts
currently  going  to  this  program  appear  to  be  much  too  inadequate,  given  the
exceptionally  high unemployment rates.
43Reduce direct  government  involvement;  encourage  NGO efforts in micro-credit.
The  Government-supported  parastatal  has  proven  both  inefficient (with  mounting
overdues)  and  irrelevant  for  expanding  informal  businesses  in  rural  Namibia.
It is best to  encourage the efforts of the NGOs who have been successful not only in
reaching the poor and women among them, but  also in designing credit  and savings
schemes of relevance to the setting up of informal businesses, more than the parastatal.
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